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Summary
The release of a new videotape by Osama Bin Laden in late October 2004 rekindled
public debate surrounding Al Qaeda’s ideology, motives, and future plans to attack the
United States.  The highly political tone and content of the two most recent statements
released by Osama Bin Laden [April and October 2004] have led some terrorism
analysts to speculate that the messages may signal a new attempt by Bin Laden to create
a lasting political leadership role for himself and Al Qaeda as the vanguard of an
international Islamist ideological movement. Others have argued that Al Qaeda’s
presently limited capabilities have inspired a temporary rhetorical shift and that the
group’s primary goal remains carrying out terrorist attacks against the United States and
its allies around the world, with particular emphasis on targeting economic infrastructure
and fomenting unrest in Iraq and Afghanistan.  This report reviews Osama Bin Laden’s
use of public statements from the mid-1990s to the present and analyzes the evolving
ideological and political content of those statements.  The report will be updated
periodically.  For background on the Al Qaeda terrorist network, see CRS Report
RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict.
Al Qaeda’s Media Campaign
Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist network have conducted a sophisticated
public relations and media communication campaign over the last ten years using a series
of faxed statements, audio recordings, video appearances, and Internet postings.1
Terrorism analysts believe that these messages have been designed to elicit psychological
reactions and communicate complex political messages to a global audience as well as to
specific populations in the Islamic world, the United States, Europe, and Asia.   Bin
Laden has personally stated his belief in the importance of harnessing the power of
international and regional media for Al Qaeda’s benefit, and Al Qaeda’s central leadership
structure has featured a dedicated media and communications committee tasked with
issuing reports and statements in support of the group’s operations.  Some officials and
analysts believe that Al Qaeda’s messages contain signals that inform and instruct
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operatives to prepare for and carry out new attacks.  Bin Laden has referred to his public
statements as important primary sources for parties seeking to understand Al Qaeda’s
ideology and political demands.2  Through his public statements over the last ten years,
Bin Laden has portrayed himself both as the leader of a consistent ideological program
and a strategic commander willing to tailor his violent messages and acts to specific
political circumstances and audiences.
Osama Bin Laden: Statements 1994-2004
Founding Principles.  Osama Bin Laden’s experiences as a logistical coordinator
and financier for the Afghan and Arab resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
during the 1980s are thought to have provided the backdrop for his belief that Muslims
could effectively defend themselves through armed struggle inspired by select Islamic
principles.  His exposure to the teachings of conservative Islamist scholars and militants
during this period provided the theological and ideological basis for his belief in the
necessity of armed resistance in the face of perceived aggression — a communally-
binding Islamic principle known as “defensive jihad” — and the desirability of puritanical
Salafist Islamic reform in Muslim societies.3  After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
Bin Laden expressed these views in opposition to the introduction of foreign military
forces to Saudi Arabia.  The presence of U.S. and other non-Muslim troops in Saudi
Arabia after the 1991 Gulf War inspired Bin Laden to renew his commitment to defensive
jihad and to advocate violence against the Saudi government and the United States. 
Declaration of Jihad.  In the early 1990s, Bin Laden emphasized his desire to
secure the withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign troops from Saudi Arabia at all costs.  Bin
Laden criticized the Saudi royal family publicly and alleged that their invitation of foreign
troops to the Arabian peninsula constituted an affront to the sanctity of the birthplace of
Islam and a betrayal of the global Islamic community.4  Finding his rhetoric and efforts
rebuffed by Saudi leaders, Bin Laden was expelled from Saudi Arabia and his ire
increasingly focused on the United States. Following a period of exile in Sudan and
Afghanistan in which his radical views sharpened, Bin Laden issued a declaration of jihad
against the United States in 1996 that signaled his emergence as an internationally
recognizable figure and offered a full account of his main critiques of an enemy he
described as the “alliance of Jews, Christians, and their agents.”5 Adopting the sensitive
historical and religious imagery of Islamic resistance to the European Crusades, Bin
Laden condemned the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, criticized the international
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sanctions regime on Iraq, and voiced his opposition to U.S. support for Israel.6 The
declaration also cited “massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines,
Fatani [as transliterated], Ogaden, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina”
as examples of a growing war on Islam for which the United States should be punished
(in spite of the humanitarian nature of U.S. efforts in Bosnia and Somalia).7
“Clash of Civilizations.”  Following his declaration of jihad on the United States,
Bin Laden released a series of statements that expanded the vision and scope of his self-
declared conflict with the United States and specified his political prescriptions for the
reformation of Islamic societies.  Echoing U.S. academic Samuel Huntington’s theory on
the impending clash of civilizations,8 Bin Laden repeated his characterization of a so-
called “new crusade led by America against the Islamic nations,” and emphasized his
belief that the emerging conflict between Islam and the West would be fought “between
the Islamic world and the Americans and their allies.”9  Bin Laden argued that the Islamic
world should see itself as one seamless community and that Muslims were obliged to
unite and defend themselves.  Turning his focus to the internal politics of the Islamic
world, Bin Laden urged Muslims to find a leader to unite them and establish a “pious
caliphate” that would be governed by Islamic law and follow Islamic principles of finance
and social conduct.10  Bin Laden repeatedly argued that Afghanistan had become a model
Islamic state under the Taliban and used religious rhetoric to solicit support for the
Taliban11 and Al Qaeda.12
Although he possesses no traditional Islamic religious credentials or authority, Bin
Laden issued a fatwa, or religious edict, in 1998 that claimed that the United States had
made “a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims”13 through its
policies in the Islamic world.  The fatwa made use of the principle of defensive jihad to
argue that U.S. aggression made armed resistance and the targeting of American civilians
and military personnel incumbent upon all Muslims. The statement also announced the
formation of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders,” or a
United Front between Bin Laden and a number of regional Islamic militant groups
including Egypt’s Islamic Jihad and Pakistan’s Jamiat-ul-Ulema.  Following Al Qaeda’s
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998) and the U.S.S. Cole in
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Yemen(2000), Bin Laden refused to take direct responsibility for the attacks, but claimed
that he approved of the strikes and shared the motivations of the individuals who had
carried them out.  In calling for similar attacks, Bin Laden argued that the bombings
should be seen by Americans and the world as retribution for U.S. policy and compared
them to alleged “massacres” of Palestinian civilians in several sensitive cases familiar to
many Muslims, and particularly to Arabs.14
Al Qaeda Post-9/11.  Osama Bin Laden’s longstanding threats to strike the United
States directly came to fruition on September 11, 2001, although prior to October 2004
he only had issued several statements alluding to Al Qaeda’s responsibility for the attacks
on New York and Washington. Following an established pattern, Bin Laden
acknowledged his support for the hijackers and repeated his claim that strikes on
American targets should be viewed by Muslims and Americans as a defensively motivated
response to perceived American aggression. Statements attributed to Bin Laden promised
further attacks and sought to justify Al Qaeda’s targeting of American civilians by arguing
that American society was morally corrupt and that American civilians should be held
accountable for the policies of their democratically elected government.15  
Reflecting on the subsequent U.S. response to the attacks, Bin Laden has described
the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as new “crusades” and highlighted the considerable
economic impact of the attacks and costs of the U.S. military response as indications of
Al Qaeda’s effectiveness. Both Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri have
criticized the population and governments of the Islamic world for failing to answer their
calls to arms and for cooperating with the United States and its allies in their war on
terrorism.  These criticisms have been coupled with renewed calls for armed “resistance”
against the United States and its allies.  Bin Laden has addressed the governments and
citizens of Europe and the United States directly in an effort to discourage support for
their current policies in the Islamic world. In April 2004, Bin Laden offered Europeans
a “truce” if they agreed to abandon their support for the United States and their military
commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The offer was resoundingly rejected by European
leaders and their citizens.  On the eve of the U.S. presidential election in October 2004,
Bin Laden made a similar statement in which he urged Americans to reevaluate their
policies toward the Islamic world and threatened to bleed and bankrupt the United States.
Implications for Al Qaeda’s Evolving Ideology and Strategy
Al Qaeda’s Audiences.  Experts believe that Osama Bin Laden’s statements
contain calculated variations in tone and content that address or appeal to various target
audiences. In his early statements, Bin Laden adopted a pseudo-nationalist tone in directly
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addressing the population of Saudi Arabia and outlining ways that specific groups in
Saudi society could support Al Qaeda.  In his most recent statements, Bin Laden has
downplayed threats of violence and attempted to portray himself as a statesmanlike figure
more palatable to Western audiences and appealing to moderate Muslims. However, the
cornerstone of Bin Laden’s religious rhetoric has remained consistent: Muslims should
view themselves as a single nation and unite to resist anti-Islamic aggression on the basis
of obligatory defensive jihad.  Accordingly, Bin Laden has often coupled his “Islamic-
unity” rhetoric with litanies of anti-Semitic statements, condemnations of Israel, and
allegations of U.S. complicity in the suffering of Muslims worldwide.  In many pre-9/11
statements, Bin Laden broadened his rhetorical outreach to appeal to non-Arab Muslims,
especially those concerned with or engaged in conflicts in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir,
and the Philippines.  Following September 11, 2001, Bin Laden has appealed directly to
national groups on the front lines of robust counter-terrorist operations, particularly the
populations of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories.  Bin Laden’s
statements also have addressed the American public in several instances that he has
characterized as attempts to explain his motives and outline steps he and his followers
believe the United States should take in order to avoid future Al Qaeda attacks. 
Pragmatic Messianism?  Although Bin Laden’s ideological rhetoric has
remained relatively consistent, the Al Qaeda leader has placed varying levels of emphasis
on specific strategic objectives and tactics in his statements over the years.  Bin Laden has
outlined specific political demands that support the image of Al Qaeda as a pliable,
pragmatic political actor.  Nevertheless, Al Qaeda’s operational record seems to indicate
that its leaders’ commitment to specific national causes and strategic objectives are
rhetorical tools designed to elicit support for their broader ideological agenda of
confrontation with the West and puritanical reform in the Islamic world.  For example,
Bin Laden’s rhetorical treatment of the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia during the
1990s is largely inconsistent with Al Qaeda’s ongoing terrorist operations there following
the almost complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Saudi Arabia in September
2003.16  Although fewer than 250 U.S. military personnel remain in Saudi Arabia, Al
Qaeda affiliates have continued a violent campaign to topple the Saudi government and
have targeted non-U.S. civilians in numerous terrorist attacks. Similarly, variations in the
intensity and prominence of Bin Laden’s anti-Israeli rhetoric has fueled suggestions that
Al Qaeda’s commitment to the Palestinian cause waxes and wanes depending on the
network’s need for support — becoming more pronounced during periods when Al
Qaeda’s actions have alienated supporters or recently as part of a more outright
ideological appeal.  Bin Laden has addressed these charges personally and argued that
support for the Palestinians and all Muslims is and will remain essential to Al Qaeda’s
cause, which is the mobilization of the entire Muslim world in resistance to perceived
U.S. aggression.17  In support of that cause, Osama Bin Laden and his deputies have
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characterized military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as new provocations and
“crusades” that justify ongoing attacks against the United States and its allies.
Tactically, Bin Laden consistently has advocated a program of retributional violence
against the United States for alleged crimes against Muslims while demonstrating
sophisticated perspectives on cooperation with non-Islamist groups and the economic
vulnerabilities of the United States and its allies.  In addressing the conflict in Iraq, for
example, Bin Laden has encouraged Islamist insurgents to work with “Socialist” groups
(Baathists) and compared cooperation between Islamists and Baathists to Arab and
Persian collaboration against the Byzantine empire in the 7th and 8th centuries.18  In calling
for Muslims to become more self-sufficient, Bin Laden has urged Arab governments to
preserve oil as “a great and important economic power for the coming Islamic state,” and
described economic boycotts as “extremely effective”19 weapons.  Bin Laden’s recent
description of Al Qaeda’s “bleed-until-bankruptcy plan” fits his established pattern of
citing the economic effects of terrorist attacks and could indicate a shift in Al Qaeda’s
strategic and tactical planning in favor of a more protracted attritional conflict
characterized by disruptive attacks on economic and critical infrastructure. Overall, Al
Qaeda has displayed a pragmatic willingness to adapt its statements to changing
circumstances while remaining a messianic commitment to its ideological agenda. 
Al Qaeda and the Jihadist International.  Although Bin Laden’s self-professed
goal is to “move, incite, and mobilize the [Islamic] nation”20 until it reaches a
revolutionary “ignition point,”21 Bin Laden’s statements and Al Qaeda’s attacks largely
have failed to effectively mobilize Muslim support for their agenda thus far.  Since late
2001, however, public opinion polling and media monitoring in the Middle East and
broader Islamic world indicate that significant dissatisfaction with the United States and
its foreign policy has grown significantly within many Muslim societies.  In light of this
trend, Bin Laden’s recent shift toward more moderate, political rhetoric and his emphasis
on the economic effectiveness of Al Qaeda’s campaign to date may be harbingers of a
renewed attempt by Al Qaeda’s central leadership to broaden the movement’s appeal,
solicit greater material support, and possibly inspire new and more systematically
devastating attacks.  Experience suggests that Al Qaeda’s leaders believe that regular
attempts to characterize Al Qaeda’s actions as defensive and religiously sanctioned will
increase tolerance of and support for their broader ideological program.  The identification
of limited political objectives and the implication that their fulfilment will resolve broader
grievances also may help to mask the group’s underlying ideological agenda.  Overall, Bin
Laden’s statements from the mid-1990s through the present indicate that he continues to
see himself and his followers as the vanguard of an international Islamic movement
primarily committed to ending U.S. “interference” in the affairs of Islamic countries and
supportive of efforts to overturn and recast Islamic societies according to narrow Salafist
interpretations of Islam and Islamic law.  His public statements, and those of his deputies,
will likely continue to play an important, calculated role in reaching these goals.
